TfL says data from 265,000 Oyster photocard accounts may have been exposed
Transport for London (TfL) says personal information associated with about 265,000 Oyster photocard accounts may have been accessed without authorization after suspicious activity on its photocard website. The potentially affected users include children with Zip cards and Londoners who hold a 60+ London Oyster photocard.
TfL detected the activity on 16 November 2026 and took the photocard system offline to restrict access. In a notification sent to affected users on 18 November, the transport authority said the incident had resulted in unauthorized access to personal information held in web accounts. It has not disclosed how the intruders gained access.
Information involved and excluded
According to TfL’s current assessment, information that may have been exposed includes account email addresses, phone numbers, home addresses, dates of birth, and security questions and answers. The authority said it does not believe passwords, bank or payment card details, or customer journey information were compromised.
TfL also said that the names and dates of birth of children with Zip Oyster cards were not affected. Photographs and copies of supporting documents were not accessed, according to the notification. The incident was limited to the photocard website and did not affect other TfL websites or services, the authority said.
The distinction between account details and card-payment or travel records is important for assessing potential consequences. While TfL says payment information and journey data were not involved, exposed contact details and addresses could still be useful to someone attempting to make a message or phone call appear credible. The possible exposure of security question answers also warrants attention, particularly if users reused those answers on other services.
Response and account recovery
TfL has notified the Information Commissioner’s Office and said it is working with partners on the investigation. The photocard accounts will remain locked while that work continues. TfL’s incident page says people who did not receive an email on 18 November were, based on information available at the time, not believed to have been affected.
When the portal is restored, affected account holders will be asked to select a new password and security question and answer. TfL also advises them to change those credentials on any other accounts where they reused them. That step is particularly relevant for security answers: unlike a password reset on one site, reuse can leave other accounts exposed if the same answer is known.
Organizations responding to incidents involving customer identity data typically need to account for more than authentication secrets. Contact information, birth dates and recovery-question answers can be used in targeted impersonation attempts or to support unauthorized account-recovery efforts. TfL has not said that such activity has occurred in this case; the authority’s published assessment describes the information potentially accessed and its containment measures.
Separate from TfL’s 2024 incident
The photocard website incident follows a separate attack on TfL’s back-office systems in September 2024. That earlier intrusion disrupted staff access to internal tools and email and halted new Dial-a-Ride bookings. TfL estimated the cost of that incident at £29 million. In July 2026, two members of the Scattered Spider group each received prison sentences of five years and six months for the intrusion.
The available information does not establish a connection between the 2024 attack and the photocard website incident. For now, TfL’s public updates identify the affected system, the categories of information in scope, and the temporary account lockout, but do not provide details about the entry method or the full investigation findings.