Weak SQL Server passwords used to deploy Monero miner and Gh0st RAT
Internet-facing Microsoft SQL Server systems with weak passwords are being targeted in a campaign that installs both a Monero cryptominer and a Gh0st remote access trojan (RAT). FortiGuard Labs, Fortinet’s research team, identified the activity in early October 2026 and rated it high severity. Its report, published November 12, did not identify the campaign’s operator or estimate how many servers were compromised.
The operation combines automated discovery, password guessing and follow-on malware deployment. Its initial Go payload included Naabu, an open-source port-scanning tool. The program obtained an IP address range from an attacker-controlled server, checked hosts for TCP port 1433—the default port for SQL Server—and recorded systems that responded. It then requested another range and repeated the scan, allowing the search to continue while the server supplied new targets.
Password guessing opens the door
After finding a reachable SQL Server, a brute-force component tried usernames including “sa” and “admin” with more than 2,700 passwords per host, according to FortiGuard Labs. A successful login gave the attackers a route to execute Transact-SQL commands on the database server. T-SQL extends SQL with programming capabilities and, in this case, was used to prepare the system for operating-system-level activity.
The commands enabled xp_cmdshell, a SQL Server feature that can run operating system commands. The attackers used it to download or unpack a loader, then set up more than one way for that loader to start again. It was scheduled to run daily and placed in the Windows Startup folder, where it would launch when the server booted.
The loader retrieved additional malware from an FTP server and registered each compromised machine with the attackers’ backend. The reported registration data included the system’s public IP address and country, Windows edition, processor and memory information, Windows installation time, user name and host name. These details could give operators an inventory of the machines under their control.
Two payloads target compromised servers
One payload was a Monero miner based on XMRig. It used the server’s processor to mine cryptocurrency and was given a name designed to resemble a Microsoft Edge update. Two scheduled tasks created by the malware used similar disguises. The miner also notified the attackers when mining began.
The second payload was a Gh0st RAT variant named to look like a Windows system process. FortiGuard Labs said the RAT’s command-and-control server had already shut down before researchers analyzed it. As a result, they examined its code without executing the malware. The reported capabilities included keylogging, data theft and more than 30 control commands. Plugins could add screen capture and remote desktop functions; other features could clear event logs, search for 78 security products by process name and steal data from the QQ messaging application.
The RAT included several persistence mechanisms: a Windows registry Run key, a service and a scheduled task configured to run every 30 minutes. Together with the loader’s daily schedule and Startup-folder copy, these mechanisms could make removal more difficult if defenders addressed only one launch point.
Defensive priorities for SQL Server operators
The campaign highlights the risks of exposing database services to the internet when credentials are weak or reused. Organizations should review whether SQL Server instances need public reachability and restrict access to approved networks and administrative systems wherever possible. Strong, unique credentials for SQL accounts—especially privileged accounts such as “sa”—and controls that limit repeated login attempts can reduce the opportunity for password guessing.
Database administrators should also review whether xp_cmdshell is required in their environment and disable it when it is not needed. Because the observed intrusion used SQL access to establish operating-system execution and persistence, incident responders should investigate beyond database activity alone. Relevant checks include unexpected scheduled tasks, Startup-folder changes, unfamiliar services or registry Run entries, and unexplained FTP-related downloads or outbound connections.
FortiGuard Labs’ findings describe a campaign that can turn weakly protected database access into a foothold for both resource-consuming mining and broader remote control. For enterprise teams, the combination is a reminder to treat SQL Server exposure, authentication policy and host-level monitoring as connected defensive concerns.