Macfinger ClickFix campaign delivers DownTheDRAIN infostealer to macOS
A Macfinger ClickFix campaign delivered a macOS information stealer dubbed DownTheDRAIN in an infection observed on November 11, 2026. The attack used a fake CAPTCHA page to persuade a user to copy and run instructions in Terminal, which retrieved a shell script and then an Apple silicon executable. In the reported case, macOS 26.7.3 blocked the malware and moved it to Trash before sensitive data could be exfiltrated.
The name DownTheDRAIN is an analyst-assigned nickname, not a confirmed malware-family designation. It reflects a function identified in a sample analyzed by Huntress: the code can identify cryptocurrency wallet addresses and redirect their contents to an address controlled by the threat actor. The observed incident provides defenders with a current example of how social engineering and user-executed commands can be used to deliver malware on macOS.
ClickFix turns a fake CAPTCHA into a delivery mechanism
The campaign’s landing page presented a fake CAPTCHA and instructions that directed the visitor to paste text into a Terminal window. The pasted command retrieved a shell script from an attacker-controlled server. That script installed the DownTheDRAIN executable, which was hosted separately. This sequence relies on the user performing the critical execution step rather than on a browser silently installing the payload.
The observed shell script was a 5,011-byte Bourne-Again shell script, while the downloaded payload was a 35,143,984-byte Mach-O 64-bit executable for ARM64. The malware was saved on the affected host as $HOME/Library/Caches/com.apple.update. The similar-looking filename and cache location are details defenders can use when reviewing endpoint telemetry, but the reported case does not establish how broadly those characteristics are used across other infections.
The analyst reported that a Mac mini running macOS 26.7.3 detected and quarantined the file before it could exfiltrate sensitive information. The account does not identify a specific security product or explain which detection mechanism triggered the block. It therefore should not be read as evidence that every installation of that operating-system version will block the malware.
Wallet handling is a notable capability
The DRAIN function described in Huntress’s analysis searches for cryptocurrency wallet addresses and can redirect their contents to a threat-actor-controlled wallet. That capability makes the malware relevant not only to organizations handling sensitive account data but also to employees who use cryptocurrency wallets on managed or personal Macs. The available details do not specify the complete set of information the malware seeks, or quantify the number of victims.
The campaign had been discussed by the analyst in September 2026, with earlier coverage of the malware on September 25. The November 11 sample offers a further opportunity for defenders to compare endpoint and network observations against the indicators below. These indicators are tied to the described infection and should be treated as leads for investigation, rather than as a complete inventory of campaign infrastructure.
Indicators and defensive priorities
Security teams can use the supplied indicators to search DNS, proxy, firewall, and endpoint records. The reported network activity included two downloads from 45.150.32[.]130 and HTTP POST requests to 171.22.131[.]24 on port 8133. The analyst observed four POST requests before the malware was blocked. The fake CAPTCHA domain and file hashes can also support retrospective searches:
- Fake CAPTCHA domain: quill-kraee-um2gf[.]pro
- Download URLs: hxxp[:]//45.150.32[.]130/37339606cba4522a?force=1 and hxxp[:]//45.150.32[.]130/4be1066a49e75?force=1
- Observed HTTP POST destination: hxxp[:]//171.22.131[.]24:8133/api/t
- SHA-256 values: 58e503cc2e6aacc6bdba54f40a7edebf7a5362bef0a9039769baaba8c472c4db for the script; 8b5026d841aa93758ec3cb55c276f84d3ec1cf459810e0d9aa5624e2776f2fcd for the downloaded executable; and c34cc30cb1cff5c47d77e62a3ba63e9a183989ec1ccdf7929beb1bcae0d41f23 for the file saved in the user’s cache directory
For endpoint teams, investigation should include searches for the cache-directory filename, the supplied hashes, and evidence of Terminal activity associated with unexpected script downloads. Network teams can review connections to the listed hosts and examine whether related requests occurred from other macOS devices. Because the delivery method depends on a visitor following instructions, user awareness should emphasize that CAPTCHA pages should not require pasting commands into Terminal. Organizations should also ensure that users know how to report suspicious prompts and that endpoint alerts are reviewed promptly.