BO Team Used Log4Shell to Breach VMware vCenter and Reach Code-Signing Infrastructure

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Kaspersky’s ICS CERT team has detailed a months-long intrusion into a Russian software developer’s network, in which the BO Team gained deep access to IT and development systems. The attackers exploited Log4Shell in a VMware vCenter Server, established backdoors on virtualization hosts, and accessed infrastructure associated with source code and software signing. The targeted company was not identified.

The developer contacted Kaspersky in June 2025 after detecting suspicious activity. Investigators attributed the operation to BO Team, also known as Black Owl, Hoody Hyena and Lifting Zmiy. The group has been active since at least 2023 and has targeted Russian organizations for espionage and disruptive activity. Kaspersky said the intrusion resulted in the theft of confidential information and affected Windows and Linux systems, hypervisors, backup servers, security management systems and network equipment.

Log4Shell provided access to a virtualization host

According to Kaspersky’s account, the attackers first accessed a Linux terminal server through an exposed SSH service. They used that foothold to survey the internal network and identify systems offering services including SMB, Kerberos, SSH, Telnet, FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, WinRM and LDAP. Attempts to log in to VMware vCenter interfaces were recorded, with some efforts failing.

The attackers nevertheless compromised a VMware vCenter Server running version 7.0.3 that was vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228, widely known as Log4Shell. The exploit gave them a remote command line with root privileges. From there, they connected to a hypervisor over SSH and enumerated accessible hosts.

On the hypervisor, the group installed a backdoor that ran hourly through a script placed in the /etc/cron.hourly/ directory and named “pgcache,” apparently to resemble a PostgreSQL component. The script retrieved another shell script, which in turn downloaded and launched Global Socket, or GSocket, to provide remote access. Kaspersky said the backdoor’s command-and-control behavior could be activated by changing a DNS record; when the service was inactive, the record pointed to 127.0.0.1.

Access spread across development and identity systems

Investigators found that the attackers used access to the virtualization environment to inspect virtual machines and firewall rules, and to reach some guest systems. They also deployed another backdoor in a second virtualization cluster and used an obfuscated script to run an ELF binary that provided remote control over SSH.

The activity extended to the software development environment. BO Team searched virtual machines for secrets, accessed a GitLab virtual machine and some source-code repositories, and obtained that server’s private key. The key was then used to connect to the organization’s Ansible orchestration system. Kaspersky also reported access to the server used to sign compiled builds of the company’s commercial software.

The researchers said the signing server could have been valuable for either of two reasons: modifying software before signing it, or stealing the organization’s digital signature for use on other malware. Kaspersky assessed that the attackers may have intended a supply-chain operation, but said rapid incident response cut off access and apparently prevented the plan from reaching its intended outcome. The report does not establish that malicious code was added to a software release.

In parallel, the intruders sought credentials and expanded their access. Kaspersky described attempts to collect privileged credentials from Windows systems, including efforts involving the LSASS process and the Active Directory database. The attackers ultimately used a domain administrator’s Kerberos ticket to access a domain controller. Reuse of the same password for system administrator accounts in different domains helped them compromise the organization’s Windows infrastructure, according to the investigation.

Legitimate tools and follow-on phishing complicated response

Kaspersky said BO Team often relied on built-in administrative utilities and legitimate protocols, including SSH, RDP and SCP, rather than deploying malware across every system. The group also used obfuscation, timestamp manipulation and deletion of event logs to hinder detection. After defenders disrupted the intrusion, the attackers attempted to obtain employee credentials through a phishing message titled “Account disconnected from the mail server.” The message bypassed SPF and DKIM checks, which Kaspersky said indicated that the attackers possessed a private key obtained after gaining control of the mail server. The phishing attempt was detected and prevented.

For defenders, the incident underscores the need to prioritize remediation of Log4Shell exposure in virtualization management systems and to monitor for unusual SSH access, scheduled scripts on hypervisors, unexpected GSocket activity, and access to GitLab, Ansible and code-signing systems. Organizations should also review privileged-account password reuse, preserve centralized logs against deletion, and treat signing infrastructure and its private keys as high-value assets. Kaspersky said containment measures removed the attackers’ access before they could complete the suspected supply-chain objective.